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Gen. [Braxton] Bragg. . .had left Chattanooga on August 27 with a force of 25,000 men of all arms, and pushing northward on [Union General Don Carlos] Buell’s flank reached Sparta, Tennessee, ninety miles west of Nashville, unmolested. It had been his intention to march directly northward to Lexington, threatening Cincinnati and thus force Buell to evacuate Tennessee and Kentucky; but at Sparta, on the 5th of September, he heard of Gen. Kirby’s Smith’s victory at Richmond, and concluded to march on Louisville, expecting to effect a junction with Gen. Smith before reaching there. He therefore on the 6th left Sparta, and, crossing the Cumberland River with his two corps under Generals [Leonidas] Polk and [William] Hardee, the former at Gainsboro and the latter at Carthage, arrived at Glasgow on the 13th and reached the railroad at Glasgow Junction with his advance. A delay then ensued in his progress by the occupation of Munforsdville by Gen. J. T. Wilder with 4,500 troops, who repulsed an attack of Gen. Chalmers with two brigades on the 15th. On the 17th Gen. Bragg, by moving his force to Munfordsville compelled the surrender of Wilder and his command. His road was then clear to Louisville, seventy miles north, but Buell was in his rear and Gen. Kirby was still at Lexington, with his advance near Covington, and his attention directed toward watching Gen. G. W. Morgan lest he should march from Cumberland Gap upon Lexington. Bragg, thus falling in his expectation of a junction and unwilling to attack Buell or advance upon Louisville with his wing alone, moved to Bardstown, fixing on that point for a later junction with Smith as affording ample assistance and believing that Buell would not venture to march into Louisville with his flank thus exposed.
A Fatal Miscalculation
His miscalculation proved fatal to his campaign. Lulled by this fancied security, he left his army at Bardstown September 28 under command of Gen. Polk and made a personal tour of inspection to Lexington via Perryville and Danville. From Lexington he went to Frankfort on the 4th of October, having previously ordered Gen. Smith to concentrate his force there and also Gen. Polk. But Buell, who displayed an energy for which he never received credit, had boldly moved to Louisville, reaching there September 29, and on October 2 marched from there in five columns with [Union General Thomas] Crittenden’s, [Alexander] McCook’s, and [General Charles] Gilbert’s corps, which he says, numbered 18,000 each. While engaged in inaugurating Richard Hawes as Confederate Governor of Kentucky at Frankfort on the 4th, Gen. Bragg was apprised of the advance of Sill’s corps in the direction of Frankfort, the sound of artillery being distinct. About the same time he received dispatches from Gen. Polk, announcing that he found it impracticable to march from Bardstown to Frankfort and after counsel with his general officers had decided to fall back to Perryville. This led to a hurried change of plans and on that afternoon Bragg started toward Perryville with Gen. Smith’s forces via Versailles or Frankfort by the way of Lawrenceburg. The fact was the Buell’s plan was to duplicate Bragg’s flanking movement to him by moving to Danville and cutting off Bragg’s line of retreat through Cumberland Gap. The consequence was that neither of these Generals expected a battle at Perryville and its occurrence was a surprise to both.
On October 7 of October Bragg, at Harrodsburg, had ordered all except Hardee’s corps to fall back to the point, leaving Hardee at Perryville as a corps of observation. On that same day Buck was near Perryville, nine miles from Perryville as if moving to Danville, via Harrodsburg, and Crittenden, with his column was Thomas, second in command, was between Bardstown and Lebanon pointed for Danville. Finding a force in front of Hardee. Bragg on the night of the 7th, believing Buell’s force scattered, ordered Gen. Polk back from Harrodsburg to Perryville with one of his divisions [Confederate General Benjamin] Cheatham’s, and directed him to attack the Federal force on his front at daylight on the 8th, repulse him and fall back to Harrodsburg, near which point he then proposed to concentrate all his forces. This plan would have succeeded had not Buell about the same time ordered Gen. McCook to join Gilbert in front of Perryville. Thus when the belated attack intended to be made on Gilbert early in the morning was not made until the afternoon, Bragg, who meantime had come to Perryville found him reenforced by McCook whose command bore the brunt of the battle.
The Plan of Battle
The country about Perryville is rolling, with the usual diversity of cleared ground and woodland pasture to be seen in the bluegrass region. Chaplin Creek runs near the town in a northernly direction with a branch, known as Doctor’s Fork, entering it from a southwest direction nearly two miles from the town. Between the two creeks were farms with some woodland, the land sloping toward each creek, and this became the battleground. Originally Cheatham’s division was to the left of the town, his right near the academy and his line nearly parallel with the Danville turnpike, while Hardee’s corps was on the right of the town and somewhat in advance, his two divisions under Gen. S. B. Buckner and Patton Anderson, being on the west side of Chaplin Creek. Gen. Bragg arrived on the ground about 9 o’clock disappointed at finding no attack made, and after reconnoitering the position moved Cheatham to the extreme right, and at noon ordered Gen. Polk to direct the attack on that wing. Meantime there was some skirmishing between the force of Hardee and Gilbert in front. The delay of the attack on the right was caused by the appearance of McCook, whose command was then arriving, and under orders from Gen. Buell, was forming on Gilbert’s right. It was nearly 2 o’clock when Cheatham moved across Chaplin’s Creek near its junction with Doctor’s fork, and with something of a left whirl struck McCook’s line before its formation was complete, throwing in confusion, capturing his headquarters equipment and compelling a new alignment much further back from the creek. Meantime, Hardee’s line advanced and later Cheatham cooperated with it in a combined movement which drove the enemy back full a mile from the original line. The loss on both sides was heavy, and especially in the division of Gen. James S. Jackson, of Rousseau’s division. He was killed early in the action while directing the fire of a battery and his body fell into the hands of the Confederates, who cared for it with all respect. Another Federal General, William Terrill, a cousin of Stonewall Jackson, and West Point graduate, was killed, and Gen. William Lytle wounded and take prisoner. When the action on the right was well begun Gen. Hardee ordered Gen. Buckner to advance his division and attack the Federal line at a salient., which was the key of Buell’s position at a point where the Mackville road crosses Doctor’s fork, near a barn and white house on the hill west of Chaplin creek.
A Stubborn Fight
From my position with Gen. Bragg upon whose staff I was, there was an unobstructed view of battle, A bright October sun some on the field and the atmosphere was so clear that I could easily recognize Gen. Buckner and his staff as his command went into action. It was in this engagement that the Fifteenth Kentucky Federal Infantry met its heavy loss near the barn which was fired by a shell and with its lurid flames added to the awful picturesqueness of the scene. Col. Curran Pope was wounded and Lt. Col. George P. Jouett and Major William P. Campbell killed. It was a stubborn fight between the brigades of Bushrod Johnson, [Patrick] Cleburne, John C. Brown, [St. John] Liddell, [Thomas] Jones, [S.A.M.] Wood, and Powell on the Confederate side, contending with those of the divisions of Rousseau, of McCook’s corps, and of the divisions of Sheridan and Mitchell, of Gilbert’s corps. A concurrent attack by part of Cheatham’s division closed the action in the retirement of the Federal lines. In his report of the battle Gen. Hardee says: “This combined attack was irresistible and drove the enemy in wild disorder from the position nearly a mile.” This particularly closed the battle, there being only some desultory firing of artillery thereafter.
Gen. Bragg in his official report says that his entire strength at Perryville “consisted of three divisions of infantry, about 14,500 and two small brigades of cavalry, Wheeler’s and Wharton’s about 1,500. Gen. Buell in his report says: “The effective force which advanced on Perryville on the 7th and 8th under my command was about 58,000 infantry, artillery, and cavalry.” One of his corps (Crittenden’s) was nearly a day’s march off, deducting for which 20,000 and 6,000 for Sill’s division of McCook’s corps absent in the division of Frankfort, would leave 32,000 as the force which Gen. Buell had at Perryville in action and available for use. But, while every man of Bragg’s force was engaged save one brigade stationed near Perryville to guard our rear and left flank, some remarkable features are disclosed in the Federal reports. Gilbert’s Corps, which had been on the ground nearly twenty-four hours before the action and posted with the choice of positions, did comparatively little fighting. In Schoepf’s division of three brigades, which were close at hand to relieve Rousseau in his extremity if ordered up or if marched to the sound of battle the official returns show but a total loss of four killed and fourteen wounded. Mitchell’s division had a total of 500 killed, wounded, and missing., while Sheridan’s division lost but 350., making a total loss in Gilbert’s Corps of 885. On the other hand, the loss of McCook’s corps of only two divisions was 3,269, making a total Federal loss, including cavalry (seventeen) of 4,241. The Confederate loss was 3,129, a much greater percentage for the men engaged. An examination of the reports of the battle will show further that the principal resistance to Gen. Bragg’s attack from McCook’s corps and that if his original design had been carried out and the attack made at midnight or before the arrival of McCook he would in all probability have had an easy victory. Another remarkable feature of the battle was that Gen. Buell whose headquarters was two and a half miles in the rear, not an extreme distance for such a line of battle, was not aware, owing to the direction of the wind and his failure to receive reports, that any serious engagement was in progress until it was virtually over. Gen. McCook in his report says that on several occasions he notified Gen. Gilbert of the necessity of reinforcements, but he declined to send them or alter his alignment except upon orders from Gen. Buell. It is evidence also that neither Generals Crittenden nor Thomas knew of the battle until 8 p.m. of the day. Gen. Buell in his official report ascribes his failure to be advised earlier of the battle raging to the too great confidence of Gen. McCook “which made him believe that he could manage the difficulty without the aid or control of the commander.”
It was indeed a bloody battle, in which men of the West and South measured themselves against those of their own discipline and courage. Gen. Bragg in his report, says: “For the time engaged it was the severest and most desperately conducted engagement within my knowledge. While Gen. McCook says: “it was the bloodiest battle of modern times, for the number engaged on our side.”
Fruitful Theme of Controversy
Thus I have attempted with as much detail, as a narrative of this kind will admit, to give an account of the battle of Perryville with the movements which preceded it. While claimed as a victory by both sides, it was a surprise and disappointment to each. Neither expected to find the other in a great force, and both attributed the failure of their plans to the nonobservance of orders by their subordinates. It was the fruitful theme of controversy on both sides, tending in part to the removal of Gen. Buell from the command of his army and leading to acrimonious controversy between Gen. Bragg and several of his officers and to the unforgiving animosity of the Kentucky Confederates for his failure to redeem the State from Federal rule when his force, if properly handled, was sufficient for the purpose. There is no more inexorable test of military merit with the public than success and no amount of explanation, however plausible, served to relieve Gen. Bragg of the violation of the military maxim of Jomini, which Gen. Hardee cited to him when in a communication from Perryville the night before the battle, he pointed out the danger of fighting Buell at that point: “Do not scatter your forces. There is one rule of our profession which should never be forgotten; it is to throw the masses of your troops on the fractions of the enemy.” Within twenty or thirty miles was Gen. Kirby Smith with full twenty-five thousand veteran troops of all arms, which, if concentrated at Perryville or Harrodsburg, would undoubtedly have overwhelmed Gen. Buell’s army, hastily organized with many raw troops and seriously demoralized by internal dissension.
The end soon came. Bragg holding the field of Perryville that night, retired next day unmolested to Harrodsburg and the junction with Gen. Smith was made there. But it was too late. He awaited Buell’s attack, but that officer declining, carried out his original idea and moved to Danville to cut off Bragg’s retreat from Kentucky. Bragg, fearing the result, took up his march rapidly for Cumberland Gap and made a successful retreat into Tennessee. i.
After the war, Johnston moved to Helena, Arkansas, where he practiced law from 1865 to 1867. In 1867, he moved to Frankfort and was the publisher of Frankfort Yeoman newspaper. He helped establish the Kentucky Press Association. From 1871 to 1875, he was Adjutant General of Kentucky and from 1875 to 1879, he was Secretary of State of Kentucky. From 1903 to 1908, he was also associate editor of the Louisville Courier-Journal newspaper. He also wrote several books entitled The Memorial History of Louisville, The First Explorations of Kentucky, and The Confederate History of Kentucky. He was also president of the Filson Historical Society from 1893 until his death in 1913. He is buried in Cave Hill Cemetery, Louisville, Kentucky.
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